

DEPT OF STATE review(s) completed.

JCS review(s) completed.

2 MAY 1948


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
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4. GERMANY: Kommandatura's authority affirmed--Murphy has informed the State Department that the Control Council has agreed "in principle" to General McNarney's proposal that the Kommandatura have authority over Berlin trade union organizations. Murphy commends McNarney

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NO CHANGE in Class. ☐

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for his success in extracting from the Soviet member a definite affirmation of the Kommandatura's authority [REDACTED]

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5. BELGIUM: US to request cut in bread ration--Embassy Brussels has been instructed to discuss immediately with Belgian authorities the advisability of a substantial reduction in wheat consumption. The US (a) notes that the Belgian bread ration, only recently reduced to 400 grams daily, contrasts with the ration of 300 grams or less in most European countries, and (b) considers that it cannot justify shipment to Belgium of grain from all sources to maintain more than a 300-gram daily ration.

6. POLAND: Mikolajczyk's views on elections and US loan--According to Ambassador Lane, Vice-Premier Mikolajczyk believes that Poland's most important problem is to obtain the withdrawal of Soviet troops, whose continued presence precludes free elections. Mikolajczyk has informed Lane that he has heard no mention in Cabinet meetings of the conditions attached to the US loan to Poland [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] and that he learned of the conditions only through Lane himself. He deplores the grant of US credit, which he feels will be interpreted as condoning the postponement of elections and as endorsement of the repressive policies of the Polish Government.

FAR EAST

7. N.E.I.: Dutch views on Indonesian settlement--Embassy The Hague has been informed by a Foreign Office official that, though the Dutch and Indonesians are near agreement "as to substance" on practically all points, they disagree on the form of expressing such agreement. The Indonesians insist on a treaty (between the "Republic of Indonesia" and the Netherlands Government) which the Dutch term "absolutely unacceptable." The return of Van Mook to Batavia is to be deferred until the Dutch Parliament has concluded "several days" of discussion on the negotiations.

US Consul General Batavia reports that pessimism over the

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negotiations is increasing in the N.E.I. because of reports that the Netherlands Government will stiffen its attitude towards the Indonesians.

25X1 8. SIAM: French demands--

25X1 [redacted] the French are willing to support Siam for membership in the UN provided the Siamese agree to return all "ceded" territory (seized by Thailand in 1941) and to render compensation for all damages incurred during the frontier incident at the time of the seizure.

9. KOREA: Restoration of private communications urged-- General Hodge has recommended that (a) JCS take immediate action to restore private communication between US-occupied Korea and the rest of the world, except Germany and Japan, and (b) the Treasury Department be urged to remove the area from the "enemy territory" category.

THE AMERICAS

10. ARGENTINA: Peron reaffirms pro-US sentiment-- Charge Cabot reports that in a recent conversation, President-elect Peron "spoke of his many American friends" and "referred very moderately to his personal differences with Braden." Peron declared that (a) World War III between the USSR and Anglo-Saxon powers is inevitable; (b) Argentina is strongly anti-Communist and must participate on the side of the US; (c) Foreign Minister Cooke acted correctly in not officially receiving the Russian Trade Mission; and (d) the US and Argentina have had their "secondary quarrels" but must think of primary interests.

Cabot suggests that Peron's motives in requesting the above meeting may have been either (a) a genuine concern over US feeling that Argentina was "flirting" with the Soviets; (b) a desire to obtain a statement which could be used with the Soviet Mission; or (c) a desire to obtain arms from the US for hemisphere defense against the USSR and to imply that failure to do so would force Argentina to turn to the Soviets.

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